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The	problem	with	the	Corbyn-McDonnell	regional
policy	–	and	where	to	look	for	lessons
Jerry	O’Shea	writes	that,	on	regional	issues,	Labour’s	economic	agenda	under	Corbyn	was	little
more	than	big	numbers.	He	compares	recent	pledges	with	how	New	Labour	sought	to	offer
power	and	economic	development	prospects	to	English	regions.
Perhaps	the	only	issue	on	which	everyone	in	the	Labour	Party	currently	agrees	is	that	the	next
leader	has	to	be	capable	of	winning	back	seats	above	the	north-south	divide.	The	election
campaign	autopsy	has	been	focussed	on	Labour’s	strategy	of	prioritising	appealing	to	potential
defectors	to	the	Liberal	Democrats	over	appeasing	Leavers.	Yet	digging	beneath	the	Brexit	issue,	Labour’s	‘radical’
economic	agenda	was,	on	regional	issues,	little	more	than	big	numbers.	Concrete	proposals	to	the	‘left	behind’
regions	were	particularly	thin	on	the	ground.
When	you	study	the	Corbyn-McDonnell	economic	plan	with	an	eye	to	places	rather	than	people	(for	example,	fiscal
plans	or	improvements	to	means-tested	and	universal	services),	and	particularly	when	you	compare	this	to	the
regional	project	of	their	much-scorned	New	Labour	predecessors,	it	is	clear	that	the	problem	with	the	geographical
dimension	of	their	platform	was	not	that	it	was	too	radical,	but	not	radical	enough.
Of	course,	the	shadow	government	did	offer	something	to	those	above	the	north-south	divide.	Amidst	the
leadership	challenge	to	Corbyn	in	2016,	the	shadow	chancellor,	John	McDonnell,	used	a	speech	in	Sunderland	to
announce	that	a	Labour	government	would	mobilise	£500bn	through	a	National	Investment	Bank	operating	‘on	the
same	conservative	leverage	ratio	as	the	European	Investment	Bank,’	requiring	a	staggering	‘£250bn	of	government
funding.’	These	figures	were	quickly	deemed	unfeasible,	and	the	figure	was	halved	in	the	2017	manifesto.
By	the	2019	manifesto,	an	additional	£400bn	was	pledged	via	a	Social	Transformation	Fund	(£150bn	spent	over
five	years)	and	a	Green	Transformation	Fund	(£250bn	over	ten	years).	Attempting	to	woo	northern	voters	in	early
November,	McDonnell—speaking	‘just	down	the	road’	from	where	his	father	worked	on	the	Liverpool	docks—
announced	the	Social	Transformation	Fund	would	be	administered	by	a	new	branch	of	the	Treasury	in	the	North.	A
plan	to	transfer	part	of	Treasury	to	the	North	hardly	supported	McDonnell’s	claim	that	“the	centre	of	political	gravity
is	[…]	coming	back	home	to	the	north,”	nor	did	the	name—National	Transformation	Unit	of	the	North—have	the
rhetorical	force	of	the	Tories’	Northern	Powerhouse.	This	plan	also	conflicted	with	a	report	from	2018	that	the
National	Transformation	Fund	would	be	headquartered—along	with	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	National
Investment	Bank—next	to	Birmingham	Main	Street	station.
The	2017	manifesto	stated	that	a	Constitutional	Convention	would	‘look	at	extending	democracy	locally,	regionally
and	nationally,	considering	the	option	of	a	more	federalised	country’.	Despite	this,	and	the	Labour	Party	being
organised	into	nine	regional	branches,	regional	autonomy	was	not	a	well	thought	out	part	of	the	Corbyn-McDonnell
agenda.
It	was	no	surprise	when	Labour’s	Regional	Manifestos	were	largely	ignored	upon	their	release	on	29	November.
The	Spectator	was	not	unjustified	in	calling	these	mini	documents	‘cut	and	paste’	jobs.	Entire	sections	were	cut	and
pasted	across	all	the	documents,	with	no	more	than	one	or	two	specific	place-based	projects	named	in	each
manifesto.	Only	the	‘Manifesto	for	London’	featured	a	personalised	section	(a	foreword	by	Sadiq	Khan).	Besides,
the	few	specific	projects	that	were	proposed	seemed	to	have	not	cut	through	to	voters.	For	example,	despite
pledging	a	fabrication	yard	and	quayside	at	Killingholme,	just	outside	of	Grimsby,	the	Tories	stole	Great	Grimsby	by
gaining	12.7%	of	the	vote	share,	corresponding	to	Labour	losing	16.7%.	Nor	did	proposed	steel	recycling	plants	at
Redcar	and	Workington	prevent	either	of	those	former	Labour	seats	falling	decisively	to	the	Tories.
A	Green	Transformation	Fund	policy	paper	of	November	2019	gave	the	Midlands	Mainline	and	the	East-West
‘science	valley’—primarily	linking	Oxford	and	Cambridge—as	examples	of	improving	‘regional	rail	services’.	While
support	was	given	to	Crossrail	for	the	North,	Johnson	had	already	promised	£39bn	for	the	project	in	July.	One
genuinely	distinct	feature	of	the	Corbyn-McDonnell	regional	policy	was	the	backing	of	tidal	power	projects	in
Swansea	and	Merseyside,	and	while	these	are	both	heartlands	and	there	are	many	more	complex	dynamics	at
play,	it	is	nonetheless	interesting	to	note	that	all	constituencies	in	these	areas	remained	red	after	the	election,
despite	considerable	Brexit	Party	surges	in	both.
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McDonnell’s	mid-election	vow	that	Labour	would	“govern	for	the	whole	of	Britain”	was	a	more	accurate	statement
than	he	perhaps	intended.	The	platform	indicated	that	power	would	reside,	more	or	less	equally	across	the	country,
at	the	national	and	local	levels,	rather	than	with	particular	regard	to	a	regional	dimension.	An	exception	might	be
Corbyn’s	indication	that	he	would	restore	regional	Government	Offices,	but	these	plans	were	never	fleshed	out.	The
single,	brief	mention	of	this	policy	in	the	2019	manifesto	was	a	reflection	of	how	difficult	it	would	be	to	arouse
excitement	or	even	support	for	bodies	that	were—when	they	existed	in	the	1990s	and	2000s—seen	by	business
communities	and	the	public	as	yet	another	layer	of	civil	service	bureaucracy.	In	another	example,	McDonnell’s
proposed	Regional	Development	Banks	were	not	even	to	be	legally	separate	from	the	National	Investment	Bank.
Looking	past	the	very	important	but	obvious	point	that	Corbyn	and	McDonnell	were	promising	a	lot	more	money
than	New	Labour,	the	latter	built	substantially	on	a	long	history	of	regionalism	in	the	Labour	Party.	With	roots	in
Norman	Crowther	Hunt	and	Alan	Peacock’s	1973	recommendation	to	establish	seven	regional	assemblies,	the	idea
of	meaningful	regional	devolution	was	nurtured	under	Kinnock	and	Blair	with	reports	and	investigations	into	regional
economic	autonomy	by	John	Prescott	(Alternative	Regional	Strategy	1982,	Renewing	the	Regions	1996).
Meanwhile,	Jack	Straw	(A	New	Voice	for	England’s	Regions	1996)	recommended	expressly	political	devolution	to
the	English	regions.
Prescott	and	Straw’s	visions	were	realised	in	Blair’s	constitutional	reforms,	with	the	Regional	Development
Agencies	Act	1998	establishing	eight	such	bodies	outside	of	London.	The	Agencies	received	staff,	funds,	and
executive	powers	from	a	vast	number	of	quangos	and	the	Government	Offices	of	the	Regions.	Overseen	by	various
government	departments,	the	regional	Agency	chiefs	had	regular	meetings	in	Whitehall	with	ministers	including
Prescott,	Brown,	and	Blair.	Initially	given	power	over	labour	markets	and	business	development,	as	the	Agencies
went	from	success	to	success,	they	were	gradually	given	Single	Pots	(non-ring-fenced	budgets)	and	additional
powers	to	influence	regional	planning,	infrastructure,	health	and	transport.	At	times	they	veered	dangerously	close
to	breaching	EU	state	aid	rules,	and	Brown	even	had	to	defend	the	Agencies	against	the	EU	Commission	in	2007.
The	1998	Act	also	established	Regional	Assemblies,	though	the	latter	were	less	successful	and	influential	than	the
Development	Agencies.
Prescott,	Straw,	Ed	Balls	(from	2005),	Richard	Caborn,	Blair	himself,	and	others	at	the	heart	of	New	Labour’s
regional	project	all	represented	constituencies	in	the	north.	Yet	the	lesson	to	draw	from	the	Corbyn-McDonnell
campaign	is	not	so	much	that	the	Labour	Party	needs	a	northern	leader	(Blair	was	categorically	not	that),	but	that	it
needs	to	think	far	more	deeply	about	how	it	can	offer	tangible	power	and	economic	development	prospects	to
regions	above	the	north-south	divide.
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